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that a stop sign be maintained at an intersection, and the city was held not
liable for failure to do so. In Doughty v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 321
Pa. 136, 184 A. 93 (1936), where city ordinance made a one way street, the
city was not held liable when it permitted street car operation in the opposite
direction. In Curranv. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 134 Minn. 392, 159 N.W.
955 (1916), where a city ordinance required gates at a railroad crossing, the
city was held not liable for damages arising from failure to erect gates. Where
the plaintiff was injured by a fire truck the view of which was obstructed by
automobiles parked along the side of the street, the court ruled that the city
was not liable since supervision of traffic on the streets is a governmental function. Bradley v. City of Oskaloosa (Iowa 1922) 188 N.W. 896. For defective
traffic light signal resulting in injuries for which the city was held not liable see
also Martin v. City of Canton, 41 Ohio App. 420, 180 N.E. 78 (1931).
In cases where misfeasance or nonfeasance of governmental duties result in
a physical obstruction in the streets, in the nature of a nuisance, cities are held
liable. In Rollow v. Ogden City (Utah 1926) 243 Pac. 791, a loose and movable
marker in the street as a "silent policeman" was the cause of plaintiff's injuries. The court held that the question of the city's negligence in rendering the
street unsafe for travel should have been put to the jury. Likewise in Jablonski
v. Bay City, 248 Mich. 306, 226 N.W. 865 (1929). There the city had placed
wires to guard grass plats from traffic. The growing grass concealed the wires.
A pedestrian tripped over a hidden wire and was injured. The city was held
liable. In Murphy v. Farmingdale,252 App. Div. 327, 299 N.Y. Supp. 586 (1937),
plaintiff collided with a concrete base on which was set a stanchion supporting
an unlighted traffic control signal, the city was held liable. However, in Shaw
v. City of New York, 165 Misc. 765, 1 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 311 (1937), where a
pedestrian was struck by an unlighted safety zone stanchion with which a
motorist collided, the city was held not liable, the court purporting to follow
the doctrine set out by the New York Court of Appeals in the Parsons case,
supra. The court voiced disapproval of the doctrine set out in the latter case,
but felt itself controlled by that holding. It would seem, however, that the court
(Supreme Court, trial division) extended the scope of the Parsons Case, and
that it might well have reached the conclusion it professed to favor by applying
the rule which the Appellate Division laid down in Murphy v. Farmingdale,
supra.
-GmRA
A. DESMOND.
Taxation-Chattels Purchased Under Conditional Sales Contracts.-A manufacturing company rented voting machines to a county. Under the terms of
the contract, the county had an option to purchase the machines. If the option
was exercised, the rental paid was to be deducted from the purchase price.
Held, the company was liable for the tax on the machines since it was the owner
of the legal and equitable title. Title would vest in the county only upon the
exercise of the option. The relationship here was that of bailor and bailee.
Automatic Voting Corporation v. Maricopa County (Ariz. 1937) 70 P. (2d) 447,
116 A.L.R. 320.
By the weight of authority, property covered by an ordinary conditional sales
contract or by an agreement in legal effect a conditional sales contract is, as
far as taxation is concerned, the property of the buyer. Thus in Massey Harris
Co. v. Leron, 60 S.D. 12, 242 N.W. 597 (1932) it was held that the conditionalvendee of a reaper-thresher was properly taxed although the legal title in the
machine remained in the vendor until such time as the full purchase price was
paid. It appears to be a clear, general principle that the buyer who is invested
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with the possession and control is properly assessed for taxation of the property
as against the seller.
A survey of the cases, however, does disclose a conflict of authority. Some
courts are willing to allow the state to tax the buyer who has possession and
control of the chattel property purchased under a conditional sales contract
because it is a practical, simple and effective method. As stated in the case of
State v. ". I. Case Co., 189 Minn. 180, 248 N.W. 726 (1933) if a company selling
farm machinery could be taxed in all the taxing districts of the state for
machinery sold to its dealers under a conditional sales contract, an inconvenient
and unjust situation would result as far as the company was concerned as
against its dealers. It was held in the case of Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
Cooper, 263 Fed. 994 (S.D. Ohio 1920) that the buyer is the proper party to be
assessed for the taxes upon sewing machines sold under a written instrument
construed to be a conditional sale contract. The frequently cited case of State
v. White Furniture Co., 206 Ala. 575, 90 So. 896 (1921) is in accord as well as
Houser & Haines Mfg. Co. v. Hargrove, 129 Cal. 90, 61 Pac. 660 (1900) which
holds that a harvester in the possession and control of the buyer under a conditional sales contract is properly assessed to such purchaser.
Other courts hold that the conditional-vendor of personal property is liable
for the tax on the property. Thus sewing machines rented by a company under
a contract providing for their purchase at the option of the lessee were held
properly assessable to the lessor-company in the city in which it maintained a
store as "stock in trade." Singer Mfg. Co. v. Essex County, 139 Mass. 266, 1
N.E. 419 (1885). In the case of Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Rich, 32 Idaho 453,
184 Pac. 627 (1919), ranges were sold to buyers under a conditional sales contract which provided that the company was not bound to make immediate
delivery. It was held that until the sale was completed by delivery that the
ranges were the property of the company and taxable against it. In Wanee v.
Thomas, 75 Cal. App. 231, 242 Pac. 509 (1925), several thousand sacks of rice
were sold subject to test. The buyer made a down payment, but the seller kept
up the insurance and stored the rice in his warehouse until final payment was
made. It was held that title to that portion of the rice which had not been tested
and was in the seller's warehouse on tax day remained in the seller who, accordingly, was liable for the tax.
There is also some authority for the proposition that a tax on property sold
under a conditional sales contract may be assessed against either the buyer or
the seller. Thus in Weber Showcase & Fixture Co. v. Kaufman, 45 Ariz. 397,
44 P. (2d) 158 (1935) the court said that under a statute providing that property
was to be assessed to the person "owning, claiming or having the possession"
either the seller or the buyer may be assessed.
Although there appears to be no Wisconsin decision directly in point, it is
probable that Wisconsin would follow the apparent weight of authority and
hold the buyer liable for the tax. The Attorney General has held that property
in possession and enjoyment of a city as buyer under a contract the terms of
which provide that the seller retain title until the purchase price is fully paid
is not subject to taxation. 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 989, 1034. That personal property
is to be assessed in Wisconsin against the party having possession and beneficial
ownership is drawn inferentially from the case of Herzfeld-Phillipson Co. v.
Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 431, 434, 189 N.W. 661 (1922).
Although it is obvious that the courts can justify taxation of either party
to the conditional sales contract, it appears to be the better practice to tax the
party who enjoys the possession and beneficial interest.
EDMUND JoHN Knzyxowsxi.

